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We distinguish two kinds of experimental activity: post-theory and exploratory. Post-
theory experiment enjoys computer support that is well-aligned to the classical theory of
computation. Exploratory experiment, in contrast, arguably demands a broader conception
of computing. Empirical Modelling (EM) is proposed as a more appropriate conceptual
framework in which to provide computational support for exploratory experiment. In the
process, it promises to provide integrated computational support for both exploratory and
post-theory experiment. We ﬁrst sketch the motivation for EM and illustrate its potential
for supporting experimentation, then brieﬂy highlight the semantic challenge it poses and
the philosophical implications.
© 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Advances in computing have led to a revolution in experimental practices in science. Much of this is focused on exploit-
ing the power of computing technology to perform calculations and generate visualisations based on pre-existing scientiﬁc
theories. Because such post-theory experiment can exploit a rationalisation of agency and state-change, it can be readily
conceived within the framework of the classical theory of computation. In other contexts, computing technology is being
used to support what can be construed as exploratory experiment, in a sense to be elaborated later. Though exploratory ex-
perimental activity is well-represented in computing practice—often in association with post-theory experiment—it is hard
to accommodate within the accepted theoretical framework of computer science. We propose Empirical Modelling (EM) as
an alternative conceptual framework for computing that is better adapted to the demands of exploratory experiment.
The phrase “experimenting with computing” admits many interpretations. Two interpretations are topical in this paper.
One refers to using computers in support of experimental activity, the other to innovative thinking associated with experiments
in practical computing. Under both interpretations, the words ‘experimenting’ and ‘computing’ are being used in a broad
sense—in contrast with the strict deﬁnitions of these activities that might be proposed in experimental science or computer
science. Speciﬁcally, the term ‘experimenting’ is being used to refer quite generally to activities that involve taking an action
whose effect is unknown, and the term ‘computing’ to the wide range of activities that exploit computer-related technology.
The four principal sections of the paper: introduce the notions of exploratory and post-theory experiment; sketch key
ideas from the philosophy of mathematics and science that motivate EM; illustrate the qualities of EM in support of ex-
ploratory experimental activity by means of a simple example; and brieﬂy indicate some of the semantic and philosophical
implications of adopting EM most relevant to theories and agency.
1. Post-theory and exploratory experiment
In thinking of experiment as ‘taking an action whose effect is unknown’, it is apparent that some degree of human
involvement is essential. An activity is experimental by virtue of how it is interpreted. Without this interpretative aspect,
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M. Beynon, S. Russ / Journal of Applied Logic 6 (2008) 476–489 477the idea of ‘performing an experiment’ is obscure. Computer science has been much preoccupied with action that is anything
but experimental in nature: its major contribution has been to our understanding of how to specify reliable procedures with
precisely determined outcomes and interpretations. The common tendency for novice programmers to develop computer
programs through informal experiment is naturally deprecated. And whilst an activity such as “using the computer to
search for the next Mersenne prime” can be viewed as experimental in so far as the outcome is unknown, it is in essence
little different from a routine numerical calculation that requires computational support.
The aﬃnity between experiment and speculative calculation informs what can be informally characterised as a ‘post-
theory’ view of experiment. In post-theory experiment, there is a reliable basis for prediction, or criterion for successful
outcome, drawn from theory or previous experience. It is then often the case that the consequences of the theory can only
be determined with the assistance of the computer. Though human intelligence typically plays a highly signiﬁcant role in
setting up post-theory experiments (as in ‘devising a criterion for a Mersenne number to be prime’ and ‘developing an
eﬃcient algorithm to check this criterion’), human interpretation is a marginal element in the activity itself. The search
process that is implemented is not traced in detail by any direct human experience. The trust in the outcome of the
computation that underpins ‘knowing that the effect of an action has been accurately determined’ is based on the premise
that what the computer has done could in principle have been done by a human computer.
It is easy to see how this notion of post-theory experiment as a form of calculation can be extrapolated to encompass tra-
ditional forms of scientiﬁc experiment. To connect action in the laboratory with calculation requires only that some process
of abstraction has taken place, whereby certain key observables have been identiﬁed and the procedures for measuring them
have been suitably formalised. The computer can be coupled to its environment so that it can generate the experimental
data required as input through making observations and performing physical actions to conﬁgure instruments—a technique
that is by now quite indispensable in many scientiﬁc investigations. The way in which human interaction is displaced in
this computer-controlled experimental activity has led some commentators to speak of “computational science” as a “new
kind of scientiﬁc method” [11].
Whilst the signiﬁcant unrealised potential for using computers for scientiﬁc experiment in this fashion must be acknowl-
edged, this paper argues from the premise that much richer conceptions of experimenting and computing are needed to
do justice to the human practices of science. The key idea is that experimental activity also has what must necessarily
be viewed as exploratory aspects, and that this requires computing support of a conceptually different kind. And though
philosophers of science are increasingly seeing roles for experimentation other than those envisaged in classical logical em-
piricism (see e.g. [10] and [8]), aligning these to computing practices poses particular challenges. As Winograd and Flores
observe in [30], computing may engage explicitly with virtual worlds, but its dominating theoretical framework is rooted in
a rationalistic philosophical tradition.
If experiment is deemed to be ‘taking an action whose effect is unknown’, the scope of this concept is surely universal—
potentially to the point of being vacuous. When all that can be experienced is taken into account, the effect of an action
cannot possibly be exactly predicted—indeed, it cannot even be uncontroversially identiﬁed or comprehensively registered.
A primitive concern, universally relevant to all sense-making—and to experimental science in particular, is establishing
contexts for an action that can be identiﬁably revisited and where there is a recognisable correlation between the action
and signiﬁcant selected ingredients of its effect. The provisional cause-and-effect relationships that have to be made for
this purpose are quite different in character from those that underpin the predictions of scientiﬁc theory and computer
calculation. Though every relationship in principle has the potential to acquire an uncontroversial objective status and to
become associated with well-deﬁned protocols and instruments for identiﬁcation and exploitation, it is ﬁrst and foremost
a relationship that is appreciated in personal and pragmatic terms. And whilst it has this nature, it is not amenable to
abstract representation independent of concrete action in context, and is much more likely to be subverted than conﬁrmed
by experiment.
It is activity of this preliminary and provisional sense-making nature that we describe as ‘exploratory experiment’. Where
post-theory experiment is associated with a stable objective context of observation in which parameters can be changed and
the outcomes observed, exploratory experiment is concerned with identifying appropriate contexts for reliable observation,
distinguishing between essential and accidental features of interaction, deciding what is deemed to be an outcome and
what is deemed to have signiﬁcant implications for this outcome.
If it seems that human involvement in post-theory experiment can be marginalised, the role for human engagement in
exploratory experiment is by contrast crucial. Only from an extreme reductionist perspective is it plausible that an automa-
ton could identify the possibilities for imaginative observation and replicate the capacity for inventive intervention open to
the human experimenter. It is nevertheless appropriate to ask whether the computer can play a useful supporting role in
exploratory experiment. Empirical Modelling (see [32,33]) has been developed as an approach to computer-based modelling
directed at just such a role. It assists sense-making by allowing the exploratory experimenter to construct artefacts that re-
ﬂect the way in which action within a context is provisionally being construed by the experimenter. Because of the manner
in which this artefact evolves, there is an intimate relationship between such an artefact and the personal understanding of
the experimenter. The most important characteristic of the artefact is that it can be readily adapted to shifting perceptions
about the nature of the agency, dependency and key observables presently at work. The status of Empirical Modelling as
“an experiment in computing” is the subject of the remaining sections of the paper.
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In the conclusion to his paper ‘Absolutely unsolvable problems and relatively undecidable propositions’ [23]—submitted
to a mathematics periodical in 1941—Emil Post writes:
. . . perhaps the greatest service the present account could render would stem from its stressing of its ﬁnal conclusion
that mathematical thinking is, and must be, essentially creative. It is to the writer’s continuing amazement that ten years
after Gödel’s remarkable achievement current views on the nature of mathematics are thereby affected only to the point
of seeing the need of many formal systems, instead of a universal one. Rather has it seemed to us to be inevitable that
these developments will result in a reversal of the entire axiomatic trend of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, with a return to meaning and truth. Postulational thinking will then remain as but one phase of mathematical
thinking.
If Post were alive today, he would ﬁnd much in academic computing to reinforce his amazement at the proliferation of
formal systems. Theoretical computer science has mathematical models and formal systems at its core: within its domain,
computer programs are viewed and developed as mathematical entities. Computing in the wild by contrast is by and large
an activity that deﬁes formalisation, in which all manner of informal and heuristic techniques are used to construct pro-
grams with primary reference to their intended meaning and function. Just as Post’s observation begs the question ‘what
is the characteristic nature of mathematics, if not the study of formal systems?’, so modern computing practice challenges
us to reposition the boundaries of computer science, and to recognise these as broader than the conﬁnes of the classical
theory of computation.
The major natural sciences have emerged from centuries of practice preceding their theory. Think, for example, of the
exploratory experimentation of Galileo, Hooke and Faraday. Computing, if it is indeed a science, is unusual in that it has
evolved with an inheritance of theory that predates most of its signiﬁcant practice. The pervasive use of computer technol-
ogy has moreover served to reinforce attitudes that privilege theory over practice. If we presume that all our experience is
mediated by symbols and logic, and can be cast in a digital form, we cannot appreciate the full import of Post’s conclusion:
“. . . that mathematical thinking is, and must be, essentially creative”. The inadequacy of a view of science that favours
abstract symbolic representations at the expense of practical interaction in the laboratory is exposed by the philosopher of
science David Gooding in his study of Faraday’s researches in electromagnetism [9]. Gooding’s analysis is helpful in iden-
tifying a perspective on computing that can embrace both its formal and informal aspects, and help in understanding its
potential for genuine experimentation.
In broad terms, Gooding’s concern is to show that Faraday’s knowledge of electromagnetic phenomena, as it evolved
through practical experiment and communication with other experimental scientists, was embodied in the physical arte-
facts and procedures for interaction, observation and interpretation that he developed, and that ‘construals’ [9] of this
nature have an indispensable role in our appreciation of the science of electromagnetism. Though Faraday’s experiments did
eventually underpin Maxwell’s mathematical theory, they initially had a far more primitive role. For instance, they served
to distinguish transient effects from signiﬁcant observables, and to relate Faraday’s personal construals of a phenomenon to
those of others who had typically employed different modes of observation and identiﬁed different concepts and terminol-
ogy. Such experiments were not conducted post-theory to ‘explain some aspect of reality’, but rather to establish prior to
the development of a theory what should be deemed to be an aspect of reality.
According to Karl Popper [22], proper empirical method consists of continually exposing a theory, through experiment, to
the possibility of being falsiﬁed. Such post-theory experiment requires stable experience that can be coherently interpreted.
It therefore calls for a kind of experience that has to be:
• interpreted with respect to a preconceived context;
• circumscribed in respect of relevance;
• amenable to consistent interpretation.
Such experience arises from parts of the world with which we are thoroughly familiar. Scientists make mathematical models
of such domains by means of conventional programs but it is unclear to what extent they can make genuine experiments
with such programs.
In contrast, the construals with which an experimenter records and reﬁnes her current provisional understanding through
exploratory interaction are:
• inﬂuenced by factors in the situation that are as yet unidentiﬁed;
• subject to interpretation and interaction in ways that are as yet unknown;
• capable of exposing inconsistencies and ambiguities that are as yet unresolved.
In the context of an exploratory activity, these characteristics are qualities of construals that relate to situation, ignorance
and nonsense respectively, and are beyond the expressive scope of a formal system. But it is with just such characteristics
that our approach to computing is chieﬂy concerned. We call it “Empirical Modelling” because of its close relation to obser-
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not ‘represent’ in a ﬁxed sense, but rather their meaning arises for the modeller in the correspondence experienced between
interactions with the artefact and interactions with the referent in the world (or the imagination). It is therefore initially a
personal meaning, created in the moment by the user’s interactions. The meaning of the construal cannot be appreciated in
isolation from these interactions, which in many cases require the skillful application of experimental techniques and may
serve no more than a private and ephemeral role in helping to record and advance understanding. The somewhat polemical
writings of the computer scientist Peter Naur are particularly relevant in this connection [20,21], as they highlight the need
to study interpretation and meaning with reference to what William James characterises as ‘the personal stream of thought’
[14]. This is a theme to be developed later in the paper.
Unlike the construction and execution of algorithms in conventional computing, Empirical Modelling is centrally con-
cerned with the much softer, and more personal, activity of sense-making through interaction. And every interaction with
an emerging artefact is itself an experiment in sense-making. So we claim this approach to computing both allows for
genuine experiment and broadens the boundaries of computing to a surprising degree. Brian Cantwell Smith, whose pro-
found analysis of computing has spanned over twenty ﬁve years, concludes in [27] that the study of computers ‘is not an
autonomous subject matter’ rather that ‘the considerable and impressive body of practice associated with them amounts
to neither more nor less than the full-ﬂedged social construction and development of intentional artefacts’. This concep-
tion is well-matched to Gooding’s notions on the development of construals in physical science, but also accommodates
the generalisation that is appropriate to our approach to computing, in which model-building is routinely concerned with
representing phenomena that—unlike those in the natural world—may be artiﬁcial, imaginary and subjective in character.
3. A simple illustrative example
The distinction that we wish to draw between computer support for post-theory and exploratory experiment will be
illustrated with reference to a simple (if somewhat artiﬁcial) example: implementing a human-player vs. computer-player
version of the simple game of noughts-and-crosses. Studies of simple games have featured prominently in AI research. An
early example of research in this genre is Menace, the Matchbox Educable Noughts and Crosses Engine, the game-playing
engine developed by Donald Michie in 1960 [19]. Our primary interest is rather different. It concerns the impact that the
way in which the features of noughts-and-crosses are captured in a computer artefact has upon intelligent human interaction
associated with both playing the game and playing with the rules of the game.
We compare two approaches to implementation, one based on functional programming (FP) principles, the other on the
use of EM principles. For the purposes of this illustrative example, we can think of noughts-and-crosses as an objectively and
formally deﬁned object of study, for which there is an abstract set of rules and an associated set of logical relationships. We
aim to show that in an FP approach, the entire program development is necessarily informed by a “post-theory” perspective,
in which the rules and logical relationships are conceptually prior to the implementation. That is to say, though there may
be stages in the development of the program, as when certain basic functions have been deﬁned but the implementation
is as yet incomplete, the identiﬁcation of such functions is essential for the development to progress. In the EM approach,
in contrast, concerns about the intended functionality do not play such a prerequisite critical role in the construction.
The primary focus is upon modelling the environment and the agency that can in principle support playing the game.
The end result is something that conceptually resembles a laboratory in which it is possible to realise a traditional game
of noughts-and-crosses but where a whole cloud of alternative ways of playing the game—and other more-or-less closely
related games—can also be equally conveniently realised.
For brevity, conventional noughts-and-crosses will hereafter be referred to as OXO, and variants of the game as OXO-like
games. A simple example of an established OXO-like game is 3-dimensional noughts-and-crosses on a 4-by-4-by-4 grid.
Within the environment of the EM “OXO laboratory”, a myriad different variants of OXO can be devised and played, but few
of these are familiar games whose rules are well-established and objectively known.
3.1. A functional program to play noughts-and-crosses
The underlying principle behind the FP approach is to represent the interaction between the player and the computer
using a function that maps a stream of inputs to a stream of outputs. Over the course of a completed game, the entire
stream of inputs makes up “the input” X , and the entire set of computer responses makes up “the output” Y . The functional
program is deﬁned by a function F such that Y = F (X). To interpret the evaluation of this function as an interactive process,
and to reﬂect the yet-to-be-determined character of the human player’s move, it is necessary to use a lazy evaluation
strategy, whereby the output Y is presented incrementally as soon as there is suﬃcient information about the input X
available.
We shall give only such sketchy details of a functional program to specify F as are needed for the purposes of discussion.
These details are loosely based upon a speciﬁc Miranda program [31] for playing 3D OXO that can be found in the Miranda
subdirectory of oxoJoy1994 in the EM archive [33]. Note that the player interacts through the command line, and the
current game state is communicated to the player using only textual output (cf. Fig. 1).
Because the evaluation is non-strict, F can be regarded as specifying the-history-of-the-game-so-far in an incremental
fashion as it receives the-history-of-the-input-so-far. The history of the game so far can be represented by a single character
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ated by the computer in response to input. Using the syntactic type conventions of Miranda, the kernel of the program is
then a single function
oxo :: [inputdatum]->[char]->[char]
whose ﬁrst argument is a list of stimuli to extend the output stream, and whose second argument is a string representation,
as displayed on the output terminal, of the history of the game to date. Though the term inputdatum is used here, it is more
appropriate to view this as a ‘list of stimuli’ that is generated in response to user input. There is an additional function
to translate the literal user input into such a sequence of stimuli. This function makes a distinction between input that
speciﬁes a valid move, input that provokes an error, and input that generates a prompt. Thus, the type of inputdatum is:
inputdatum ::= Prompt | Error | NodeNumber num
and there is an additional ﬁltering function to generate a stream of inputdatum from the stream of characters input at the
terminal by the player.
To implement the computer player, an additional function is introduced that associates a value with each square of the
current board. A simple way to implement such a function is to consult the contents of the lines that pass through that
square, and to attach a weighting to the square accordingly. For instance, a high weighting would be given to playing in a
square if this leads to an immediate win or prevents immediate loss.
3.2. Modelling with deﬁnitive scripts
The term ‘deﬁnitive (≡ deﬁnition-based) programming’ applies to a method of deriving program-like behaviours from
a broader activity that we call ‘modelling with deﬁnitive scripts’ that is itself a primary ingredient in Empirical Modelling.
A deﬁnitive script comprises a set of deﬁnitions of variables in which each variable either has an explicit value, or is deﬁned
implicitly in a non-cyclic fashion in terms of other variables. The script is understood to deﬁne a state in a very general
sense, and this state is subject to change as variables attain different values. It is of the essence that a variable in a script
is not to be construed as a mathematical variable, and to this extent its interpretation more closely resembles that of a
procedural variable that can take different values. For reasons that will become apparent, we prefer to refer to the variables
in a script as observables in order to emphasise their distinctive potentially dynamic nature.
Modelling with deﬁnitive scripts (MWDS) entails developing a script, together with a family of interactions and inter-
pretations, with reference to direct experience of an external situation that is conceptually distinct from manipulation of
the script. The relationship between a spreadsheet and an examination marking situation serves as a simple illustration of
how such an interpretative mechanism operates, though it is not in all respects suﬃciently representative of MWDS. The
cells of the spreadsheet have values that typically relate to external observables—such as the mark obtained by a student
in an examination, or the average mark awarded for a module. The deﬁnitions of the values in these cells express expec-
tations about how one value depends upon others—that is, how it is subject to change when other values are updated. In
the terminology used throughout this paper, changing the value of an explicitly deﬁned cell or modifying the deﬁnition of
an implicitly deﬁned cell are both described as ‘redeﬁnitions’. The variety of possible interpretations of redeﬁnitions in a
spreadsheet has a particularly signiﬁcant role to play. In our illustrative example, for instance, a single redeﬁnition might
correspond to introducing or adjusting a mark for a student, scaling the mark of a module, or extending the spreadsheet to
take an additional module into account.
MWDS involves framing networks of deﬁnitions of observables resembling those that link the values of cells in a spread-
sheet. In interpreting the state associated with a script, the modeller is obliged to have an external situation in mind,
whether this is presently at hand in the modeller’s direct experience, or only exists in her imagination. The observables in
the script will have direct counterparts in this situation. Interaction with the script involves the introduction or removal of
deﬁnitions from the script, and the redeﬁnition of pre-existing observables. This interaction is guided and interpreted with
reference to what kind of changes in the external situation are enacted or conceived by the modeller.
Within the external situation, the modeller not only perceives observables that correspond to the observables in the
script, but can also identify correlations in the way that these observables change. Speciﬁcally, there are dependencies within
the situation, so that when the value of one observable is changed, the values of other observables also change according
to some predictable pattern. It is these dependencies that are expressed in the deﬁnitions of observables within the script.
If an observable is redeﬁned, and another variable is implicitly deﬁned in terms of it, its current value will be updated as
if in one and the same action. In general, there will be many different sources and kinds of state-change in a situation.
In MWDS, we aspire to represent all such state-changes by redeﬁnitions. At the same time, it is helpful to classify the
observables, deﬁnitions and potential redeﬁnitions associated with a script according to the nature of the agents to which
they are attributed and the privileges they have to perform state-changing actions.
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3.3. A deﬁnitive program for playing OXO
A deﬁnitive program for playing OXO that exhibits the same behaviour as the functional program described above is
implicit in one of the speciﬁc models within the “OXO laboratory” at oxoJoy1994 [33], [3]. The appropriate model is built
up by ﬁrst introducing observables to represent the locations and contents of the nine squares of the OXO board and to
record the squares that make up winning lines. Once these observables are in place, simple redeﬁnitions serve to place Os
and Xs on the board. For any given conﬁguration of Os and Xs, the informed player can directly observe its status as an
OXO position: identifying whether there is a winning line of Os or Xs for instance, or whether the position can be deemed a
draw. Given a position and a particular square, the skillful player will be able to attach some value to playing in that square,
and this too may be represented by an observable in the script. Additional observables that are required in order to be able
to play the game relate to issues that are not explicit in a given static position, but must be determined with reference to
the context and the history of the interaction with the board to date. A player has as an observable the knowledge of when
it is their turn to move, and this can be given by different criteria. The simplest criterion might be based on which player
moved last; a more sophisticated one on how many Os and Xs are currently on the board, and who played ﬁrst.
The requisite observables and dependencies needed to construct such a model can be described within our modelling
framework (as supported by the interactive Web-EDEN environment [34] depicted in Fig. 1). For the purposes of the present
comparison, it is helpful to restrict attention to the kind of model-building that can be done without recourse to graphical
elements, such as line drawings or visual displays, though the latter features are naturally quite central to the concept of
deﬁning observables in Empirical Modelling (as will be brieﬂy discussed in Section 4). The way in which the modeller can
interact with the script that underlies the OXO laboratory is highly open-ended. “Making redeﬁnitions” is an activity that
subsumes the process of incrementally building up the script so that it incorporates ever more sophisticated observables,
and this process of elaboration has no clearly deﬁned limits. A redeﬁnition can also correspond to a step in simulating a
routine action that occurs in playing the game, the correction of a conceptual error, or an exploratory action intended to
expose the characteristics and potential of the current state. How a particular redeﬁnition is to be classiﬁed and interpreted
is a matter for the modeller to decide, subject to the constraints imposed by the commonsense connection between the
script and the external situation to which it refers.
For the purposes of playing OXO, a simple protocol for making and automating redeﬁnitions will suﬃce. A move by
the human player is effected by manually entering a redeﬁnition such as ‘s5= o;’ to indicate the entry of an O into the
central square of the board. An action of the computer player is similarly effected by making a redeﬁnition of the form
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for instance, to the content of the board. In determining which redeﬁnition to make, the “computer player” will emulate
a strategy for observation and action that the human player might use: for instance, basing its play on ‘observing’ which
square has the highest value according to the contents of the lines that pass through it. In the process of development,
automatable actions of this nature are ﬁrst disclosed through exploratory interaction on the part of the modeller.
3.4. Experimenting in the OXO laboratory
Much more interesting than the standard program-like behaviours that can be realised within the OXO laboratory are the
experimental possibilities. We may explore for example how a variant of OXO (“mirror OXO”) might be played if only the
squares on or above the bottom-left to top-right diagonal were ‘real’ squares, and the contents of the other squares were
derived by mirror reﬂection in the diagonal. In a ﬁrst attempt to construct mirror OXO, we can make the redeﬁnitions:
s9 is s1;
s8 is s4;
s6 is s2;
It then appears that when O plays in the top left hand corner, an O also (correctly) appears in the bottom right. However,
the automatic player X, which determines when to make a move according to who made the ﬁrst move and how many Os
and Xs there are on the board, now responds by making two moves, entering Xs into the centre and bottom left squares,
contrary to the intended rules of mirror OXO. One way to remedy this is to take account only of the pieces that are placed
on real squares when assessing the number of Os and Xs on the board. This can be done by deﬁning a new observable
allrealsquares and modifying the observables that register the number of Os and Xs that have been played:
allrealsquares is [s1,s2,s4,s3,s5,s7];
nofx is nofpieces(allrealsquares, x);
## was nofpieces(allsquares, x);
nofo is nofpieces(allrealsquares, o);
## was nofpieces(allsquares, o);
Playing the game with this modiﬁed script leads to the following sequence of moves, where the automated player places an
X illegally on a virtual square:
O.. O.. O.O O.O
... .X. .X. .XX
..O ..O ..O ..0
This behaviour stems from the fact that where the human player adapts to the revised rules by exercising discretion, the
automated player still acts as if all squares were available. This can be remedied by revising the deﬁnition of the observable
availsquare, so that a square is available not only when its content is as yet undeﬁned, but when it is also a ‘real’
square:
isrealsquare is (square!=6) && (square<8);
availsquare is (allsquares[square]==u) && isrealsquare;
At this point, there is one further issue to resolve—the need to recognise that the board is full when 3 fewer squares are
occupied:
full is (nofx + nofo == nofsquares - 3);
Reference to the screenshot in Fig. 1 shows that when this redeﬁnition of the observable full is introduced, the game is
at once registered as a draw, in much the same way that a human player might respond immediately in the current context
when the impact of a new and unfamiliar rule is brought to her attention.
3.5. Comparing and contrasting functional and deﬁnitive programs
On the face of it, the experimental interaction involved in constructing mirror OXO is neither more nor less than a
process of debugging. What distinguishes it from the kind of program hacking that is to be deprecated is the intimacy of
the relationship between the observables in the script and meaningful entities in the game-playing situation. What is more,
this relationship is prominent in the modeller’s direct experience throughout the process of revising the model, and can be
sustained from moment to moment in the stream of thought. Though the interactions described above are very simple, they
illustrate the “qualities of construals that relate to situation, ignorance and nonsense” alluded to in Section 2. The modeller
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model of this situation that embodies suﬃcient understanding as to be well-adapted to accommodate unknown aspects and
unforeseen possibilities, and can mould this model to reﬂect changes in her understanding whether or not this is misguided
or nonsensical in relation to some preconceived rules.
The interaction displayed in Fig. 1 illustrates the points of aﬃnity between MWDS and experimental interaction in a
laboratory. The fact that no further move is possible, but the current state is not identiﬁed as drawn, provokes a sequence
of interactions closely resembling those that an experimenter might make in revising an unsatisfactory construal. The fact
that O is invited to play, though every square is occupied, draws attention to the observable o_to_play. The deﬁnition of
this observable is inspected and found to be true because the observable end_of_game is false. This observable is deﬁned
in such a way that it is at once apparent that the observable draw is false. The deﬁnition of draw in turn exposes the fact
that the observable full is no longer appropriately deﬁned, and motivates the redeﬁnition displayed above. Throughout
this detective process, the modeller is able to appeal to robust commonsense notions of agency and readily project herself
into the role of another agent in her imagination.
The vivid and explicit manifestation of meaningful state and agency in the deﬁnitive script stands in sharp contrast to the
way in which the functional program obscures all distinctions beneath a veil of referential transparency. Within the abstract
functional evaluation, there is no clear distinction between the consequences of a player move and a computer move—such
is the neutrality of the evaluation activity that it makes no sense to ask whether the computer move is a consequence of
the player’s move, or an independently initiated response. There is but one clearly deﬁned sense of movement between
one meaningful situation and another, as ordained by the valid positions and moves of the game, and what representation
of state change there is arises from a non-logical ingredient (the lazy evaluation strategy) that sits uneasily within the
framework of referential transparency. State change is only possible at all because it has no essentially experimental char-
acter, being deﬁned by a preconceived protocol for transformation whose interpretation is not open to negotiation. What
is even more problematic in relation to the notion of experiment is the limited scope that FP affords in respect of any
experience of state. This is in complete contrast to the way in which all manner of perceptualisations of the current state
can be freely introduced by adjoining suitable dependencies to a deﬁnitive script (cf. for example, oxoGardner1999 and
3doxoRoe2001 in the EM archive [33]).
Despite these obvious and radical differences between a functional program and a deﬁnitive program for playing OXO,
there are signiﬁcant points of similarity. The functional programming script is composed of deﬁnitions of variables of type
function (even higher-order functions, that take functions as arguments, and/or return functions as outputs). The way in
which this script is incrementally crafted resembles the creation of a deﬁnitive script, in that it reﬂects developing under-
standing on the part of the programmer. Viewed in this way, the script is a record of states in program development.
What is more diﬃcult to sustain is the notion that the variables in the script are associated with observables associated
with playing a game of OXO, though indeed they are in a very abstract and sophisticated sense. From a program comprehen-
sion perspective, the problem is that these observables—being subjected to highly artiﬁcial modes of observation associated
with a particular ritualised pattern of interaction—are no longer recognisable as the simple observables they might other-
wise be. Consider for example: the current state of the board, the player whose turn it is, or the set of squares that make up
a line. What we can’t do is to connect these variables with observables in any other ways in which they might participate
in a ‘non-standard’ scenario involving a OXO game, as when a player cheats or a piece falls off the board.
Because of the poor correspondence between variables and familiar everyday observables in the functional OXO program,
comprehension is hard. Even when the “literate programming” [15] style afforded by the Miranda environment is taken into
account, it is challenging to address the issues of human readability. In the imagination of the human interpreter, states and
observables most naturally present themselves in a concrete conﬁguration, but the emphasis in using FP to represent the
interaction is upon comprehending the total behaviour that abstracts away from any particular conﬁguration. The state that
the functional program represents is not of the kind directly encountered in experience; it presumes a sophisticated mode
of observation that is only possible courtesy of a post-theory stance. This illustrates a motivating idea in EM, consistent with
Gooding’s study of the role of construals: that a formal speciﬁcation of state, however sophisticated, is not as expressive as
an appropriately constructed interactive artefact where the detailed understanding or experiencing of a speciﬁc situation is
concerned. This claim can be supported simply by considering the qualitative difference between the two OXO programs as
interactive artefacts, but can be sustained with even greater force when the prospects for richer non-textual representations
are taken into account.
4. Semantic and philosophical implications
This section discusses some semantic and philosophical implications of Empirical Modelling. It has three parts. The ﬁrst
motivates a connection with William James’s notion of Radical Empiricism. The second and third brieﬂy elaborate this
connection with reference to the notion of agency in EM and the semantics of MWDS.
4.1. EM from a philosophical perspective
The technical discussion in Section 3 highlights EM in its relation to programming. This was the initial point of departure
where understanding EM in relation to computer science is concerned. Over many subsequent years, the agenda of the
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graphics, collaborative design, decision support, ﬁnancial modelling, educational technology and humanities computing (see
[32] for a full list of relevant publications). Relating EM to computer support for exploratory experiment establishes another
kind of connection with computing and science. The philosophical legacy of investigating applications more distant from
science is an appreciation of how well-matched the framework of EM is to William James’s ‘philosophic attitude’ of Radical
Empiricism [4,13]. This section of the paper provides more context for this claim.
From the comparison between functional programming and EM in the previous section, it might seem natural to conclude
that EM is best represented as an alternative form of programming with semantic roots in a realist philosophical outlook.
The emphasis upon developing deﬁnitive scripts with reference to direct experience of an external situation strongly sug-
gests a dualist framework where the authenticity of the model is underwritten by a real referent. For this purpose, the
philosophical accounts of science of Hacking [10] or Galison [8] may seem more appropriate than that of Gooding.
Deeper reﬂection on the character of EM, and broader experience of its potential applications points to a rather different
conclusion. The concept of functional programming is closely related to that of formal speciﬁcation. In addressing the
question “What can we expect of program veriﬁcation?”, the distinguished software consultant Michael Jackson [12] points
out four limitations of formalisation that apply to ‘software intensive’ systems:
The formalisations of environment properties and system requirements are necessarily imperfect. First, because formal
terms will be unavoidably fuzzy in their deﬁnition and interpretation. Second, because values of continuous phenomena
must be approximated. Third, because there are no frame conditions: the natural world allows no bound to the phenom-
ena or properties that may prove relevant to the truth or falsity of an assertion. Fourth, because physical properties are
not in general compositional: effects that can be properly ignored for each property individually may play a critical role
in their composition.
EM aspires to modelling environment properties and system requirements by developing computer artefacts similar in
character to Gooding’s construals [9]. The deﬁnition and interpretation of an EM artefact is negotiated by the modeller
through an ongoing process of interaction. This process resembles a performance in that it potentially takes different forms
and develops in different directions on each realisation. Only when this process acquires a ritual character is it conceivable
that, through introducing automation in a discretionary fashion, the artefact can sustain formal program-like behaviours.
The practice of EM highlights the essentially pragmatic nature of the identiﬁcation of observables, dependencies, agents
and agency. The deﬁnitions in a script are not to be construed as propositional statements expressing law-like constraints.
In the modeller’s interaction with an EM artefact, any observable is subject to redeﬁnition at any time. Whether or not
such a redeﬁnition is appropriate or meaningful depends entirely upon how well the new conﬁguration of observables,
dependencies and agency in the artefact reﬂects what the modeller has in mind by way of an external situation being
invoked, or by way of a purpose for changing the state of the model. In explaining EM principles, or introducing EM tools,
for instance, it is sometimes helpful to make quite arbitrary redeﬁnitions simply in order to demonstrate the nature of the
artefact or the qualities and limitations of the modelling environment.
In motivating the adoption of a Jamesian philosophical perspective, it is instructive to contrast the way interaction with
a deﬁnitive script is to be interpreted with the ‘logical positivist’ proposal regarding meaning advanced by Schlick in [26].
Schlick distinguishes two types of impossibility: logical and empirical impossibility. Logical impossibility refers to what
Schlick identiﬁes as “a discrepancy between the deﬁnitions of our terms and the way in which we use them”. By way of an
example of a sentence representing a logical impossibility, he cites: “The child was naked, but wore a long white nightgown”.
The criterion for a sentence to be meaningful is that it should represent a logical possibility. Empirical possibility in contrast
“is determined by the laws of nature”. To assign a truth value to a meaningful sentence requires stipulating conditions for
its veriﬁcation. By way of illustration, Schlick asserts: “the proposition ‘Rivers ﬂow uphill’ is meaningful, but happens to be
false because the fact it describes is physically impossible”.
Schlick’s proposal is of course an archetype for many related proposals that have been the subject of controversy in the
philosophy of science ever since. Some of the seminal ideas associated with this controversy can be found in A.J. Ayer’s essay
on Veriﬁcation and Experience [1]. It is beyond our competence and scope to discuss in depth the relationship between the
outlook on meaning and veriﬁcation that is most congenial for EM and the many perspectives within the broad logical
positivist tradition of which Schlick’s is but one representative. Some pointers to key issues may nonetheless be useful to
readers better qualiﬁed to examine them critically by considering them in their proper philosophical context.
Though a deﬁnitive script is a syntactic object, our emphasis in interpreting it is upon how the observables in the script
are experienced as determining a state “as of now”. In the formulation of a script, the notion that deﬁnitions are attached
to observables entails the notion that there is at most one value associated with an observable in any particular state. The
value of an observable may exceptionally be undeﬁned, but is never over-deﬁned. For instance, the point of intersection of
two lines may be non-existent, but will never have more than one value. There is here an echo of Schlick’s notion of logical
impossibility: within a script there is no means to express the idea that “the child is naked” and that “the child is wearing
a long white nightgown”, since ‘to be naked’ would by deﬁnition be ‘to be not wearing anything’.
Part of the appeal and power of the EM environment is that it is possible to manipulate a script in such a way that the
faithfulness of its correspondence to an external referent is the subject of negotiation. In much the same way that Schlick
contemplates logical possibilities that are empirical impossibilities, the observables in a script can readily be conﬁgured so
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Within EM, this is the point of entry to a contingent and pragmatic nature of truth such as Schlick is also promoting
through highlighting the importance of stipulating the conditions for veriﬁcation. And indeed—in keeping with Schlick’s
remark to the effect that “it will not deprive a proposition of its meaning if the conditions I stipulate for its veriﬁcation are
incompatible with the laws of nature” [26], p. 352—by changing the sign of gravity, we can arrange for rivers to ﬂow uphill.
There is a major difference between the context in which Schlick is contemplating interpretation and veriﬁcation and
that associated with interpreting and validating a deﬁnitive script. In evaluating whether a deﬁnitive script effectively em-
bodies the characteristic pattern of observables and dependencies and admits the kind of agency that is associated with
an external referent, the modeller’s only concern is with what is either directly accessible in the current state or what can
be immediately disclosed by interaction in the current state. (In practical terms, the modeller is either directly observing
such current values as are visually expressed in the computer artefact, making a direct query to establish the current values
of hidden observables, or probing the extant dependencies and the latent possibilities for simulating agent action through
making speculative redeﬁnitions.) By contrast, Schlick is invoking experience of a more comprehensive nature, such as might
putatively correspond to a “full exploration” of the possible trajectories that can be traced through extended interaction with
the deﬁnitive script. Many of the philosophical problems identiﬁed by Ayer and other commentators can be attributed to
this appeal to a more comprehensive notion of experience. They include: the problem of induction, the merits of veriﬁcation
and falsiﬁcation, and the relevance of veriﬁcation that takes place “in the immediately present experience of the subject”
(as mooted by C.I. Lewis and cited by Schlick in [26], p. 345).
In part because of the broader context for experience that Schlick is invoking in his discussion of truth, the semantic
notions he is entertaining are far more complex than those that surround the interpretation of a deﬁnitive script—at least
in general. For instance, in framing sentences that represent logical impossibilities, Schlick includes a sentence that refers
both to past and future times: “My friend died the day after tomorrow” [26], p. 349. He also considers what it means to
“verify a proposition about a future event” [26], p. 346 and to verify ‘immortality’ [26], p. 356. By contrast, the content
of the observables in a deﬁnitive script refers only to the current state. This distinction informs our contention that the
deﬁnitions in a script are not to be construed as propositions. To say “the sky is blue now” is not to say “the sky is blue”.
No proposition relating the observables in a deﬁnitive script can be veriﬁed without ﬁrst establishing a convention as to
what constitutes admissible interaction with the script; it would be quite invidious to speak of comprehensive exploration
of the possible experience that is associated with interacting with it.
Central to the problems that have been identiﬁed with Schlick’s proposal is concern about the relationship between
language and immediate experience. In its broader context, Schlick’s intention is to describe what he perceives to be the
logical structure of experience [17]. Whilst it may be plausible to connect logic with a body of experience that is suitably
circumscribed, so that it becomes possible—at least in principle—to make generalisations and verify relationships, there is
no comparable way to link logic to what is as-of-now given in immediate experience. As Ayer [1] remarks in connection
with Carnap’s attempt to link language with experience through the notion of “protocol-statements” [7]:
[O]ur answer to [Carnap’s] question “What kinds of word occur in protocol-statements?” cannot depend simply upon a
conventional choice of linguistic forms. It must depend upon the way in which we answer the question “What objects
are the elements of the given, direct experience?” And this is not a matter of language, but a matter of fact.
Ayer’s comment underlines the futility of seeking to give a formal account of the semantics of a deﬁnitive script. The con-
nection between a script and its referent is of a qualitatively different kind. It is not formally mediated by a declared abstract
correspondence such as exists between a set of logical statements and a model of those statements. It has necessarily to
be itself given in experience, in just such a manner as is required for the purpose of grounding an abstract formal system.
A plausible hypothesis is that this grounding is effected through the perceived congruence between observables, depen-
dencies and agency in the script and in its referent, which can be disclosed in immediate experience through exploratory
interaction.
The above discussion provides the context for appreciating the current status of our thinking about EM in both philo-
sophical and practical respects. When Schlick [26], p. 353 writes:
Expressibility and veriﬁability are one and the same thing. There is no antagonism between logic and experience. Not
only can the logician be an empiricist at the same time; he must be one if wants to understand what he himself is doing.
he is expressing a sentiment that has great topicality for modern computing. It has clear points of connection with devel-
oping software so that the way in which machine instructions are formally conceived and expressed is well-matched to the
way in which we evaluate their consequences in experiential terms. The diﬃculty in realising Schlick’s vision is highlighted
both by the subsequent fate of the ‘logical positivist’ programme and by Jackson’s observations concerning the formalisa-
tion of environment properties and system requirements. It relates to the extreme diﬃculty and complexity of the task of
crafting patterns in experience that are stable enough to cope with evolving and volatile environments yet subtle enough to
meet rich requirements. For this purpose, unless the development of a system is a matter of routine design, an exploratory
activity that precedes the introduction of formal language is an essential prerequisite.
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experience. It is necessarily an account that has a descriptive rather than an analytic character, and this may be responsible
in part for its relative neglect [28]. The central challenge in interpreting Empirical Modelling is to give clear expression to
the idea that relationships between observables, which are in no sense absolutely constrained, and are subject to evolve
and be modiﬁed in the course of interaction, can nonetheless serve a purpose in comprehension and communication. That
this is found to be the case in practice can scarcely be doubted; the OXO model itself is a simple illustration of this fact.
Our justiﬁcation for aligning EM so closely with Radical Empiricism can be traced to the distinction that James makes
between ‘understanding backwards’ and ‘understanding forwards’ [13], p. 238. ‘Understanding backwards’ is associated with
giving explicit formal expression to relationships as static constraints in the spirit of logic. ‘Understanding forwards’ is
associated with that process of interaction with artefacts by which relationships are made in experience. Both kinds of
understanding, which might equally aptly refer to post-theory and exploratory experiment, are represented in sense-making.
The signiﬁcance of Radical Empiricism in this connection is suggested by James’s observation [13], p. 238 to the effect
that:
Radical empiricism alone insists on understanding forwards also, and refuses to substitute static concepts of the under-
standing for transitions in our moving life.
4.2. Agency in EM
The use of computing technology to support post-theory experiment is closely bound up with fundamental philosophical
issues concerning agency and interaction. One archetype for computing involves making the transition from human to
automated activity. What was formerly carried out by human agents exercising their discretion to act in certain prescribed
ways is now effected through the programmed interaction of computational and physical devices. To distinguish these types
of activity is to acknowledge that human processes are not—or at any rate need not—be fully rationalised, and that human
activity often calls upon people to show initiative in acting outside the accepted conventions and rules. The role of theory
in automated activity is to account for behaviour in objective terms, eliminating the need to take account of singular actions
that seem to require human imagination and intervention. How we construe the relationship between these two kinds of
activity is deeply inﬂuenced by the status we accord to the natural laws that mediate the behaviour of physical devices and
the mathematical abstractions that underlie the computational activity, and the extent to which we feel it is appropriate to
account for human intelligence by a computational theory of mind.
Functional programming exposes some of the key issues surrounding computer support for post-theory experiment in
microcosm. A functional program appears to establish a direct correspondence between a mathematical speciﬁcation of a
function and agency in the external world. This highlights the philosophical challenge of reconciling the abstract nature of
mathematical entities with the causal theory of knowledge to which Turner alludes in [29]. Yet in making the transition
from human to automated activity, as the quotation from Jackson in Section 4.1 highlights, there is a clear need to make
effective connections between concrete agency in the real world and propositions about abstract behaviours.
Theoretical computer science offers little conceptual support for supposing that this problem can be addressed by invok-
ing different programming paradigms. Notwithstanding the developments in our understanding of programming languages
over the last ﬁfty years, the mathematical semantic model underlying functional programming remains quite central [29].
Even in using object-oriented paradigms and agile software development processes, functional abstractions play a central
role, and there is nothing in the theory of computation to justify a radical distinction between one way of realising a
functional relationship and another.
A sceptical reader who is not convinced by the comparison in Section 3.5 may question whether the distinction between
‘functional programming’ and ‘modelling with deﬁnitive scripts’ is any more fundamental. The informal semantic mecha-
nism that operates above the computational level in spreadsheets offers some evidence for this (c.f. Section 3.2). Further
practical insight is gained from observing the semantic incoherence that results from adding dependency as a feature to a
conventional programming environment [24]. It is also telling that the only bona ﬁde computational behaviour associated
with a deﬁnitive script is concerned with dependency maintenance, an activity that is invisible in the interpretation of the
script, and whose ﬁtness for purpose draws upon all manner of pragmatic issues concerning (e.g.) the speed of update, the
appropriate criterion for timeliness, and acuity of perception.
The contingent nature of the interpretation surrounding deﬁnitive scripts does not sit comfortably with abstract com-
putational notions. In considering what it means for a script to represent a situation rather than a behaviour, many issues
that an FP approach seeks to address through a move towards abstraction are problematised. In MWDS, there is no way to
abstract away unruly agency, nor any guaranteed access to abstract reasoning that is offered by a mathematical semantics.
It is necessary to craft the mechanisms of state-change and interaction and take explicit and context-dependent account of
timing, response and synchronisation. In this respect, the essentially pragmatic notion of dependency has a critical role. On
the one hand, identifying dependencies is the means to exposing independent agency and the basis for conceptually simpler
models of concurrency. On the other, it is inextricably linked with concerns such as speeds of propagation and response and
matters of skill and perception.
Making sense of MWDS entails complementing the kind of world-view that a predominantly post-theory perception of
science promotes, where theory about behaviour displaces explicit consideration of agency. To accommodate understanding
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they are deemed to effect, in a totally different light. MWDS is essentially concerned with crafting events that can be con-
strued as reliable and can become part of systems and rituals. It is such events that legitimise and sustain the apprehension
of “law-like behaviour” as a category of experience.
As has been explored in our previous work [4], this outlook is in line with William James’s philosophical stance in his
Essays on Radical Empiricism [13]. In The Experience of Activity [13], p. 180, James contends that there can be no absolute
authority to justify the attribution of agency:
. . . no philosophic knowledge of the general nature and constitution of tendencies, or of the relation of larger to smaller
ones, can help us to predict which of all the various competing tendencies that interest us in this universe are likeliest
to prevail.
On his basis, James sets out a pragmatic stance on matters of causality [13], pp. 185–186:
I conclude then, that real effectual causation as an ultimate nature, as a ‘category’, if you like, of reality, is just what we
feel it to be, just that kind of conjunction which our own activity-series reveal. We have the whole butt and being of it
in our hands; and the healthy thing for philosophy is to leave off grubbing underground for what effects effectuation, or
what makes action act, and to try to solve the concrete questions of where effectuation in this world is located, of which
things are the true causal agents there, and of what the more remote effects consist.
4.3. A semantic framework for MWDS
James’s discussion of causality highlights his concern for rooting knowledge in the ‘life-world’ [14], p. 202: the “truth”
of our mental operations must always be an intra-experiential affair. His use of the term ‘conjunction’ alludes to the central
principle underlying Radical Empiricism—that the connections between parts of experience are as much empirically given
as are the separations. For James, the primary conjunction is that between experiences that succeed one another in the
stream of thought, and so are perceived as belonging to one and the same entity. In MWDS, conjunctions of this nature play
a quite fundamental role. There is no ‘deﬁnitive program to play noughts-and-crosses’ associated with a single deﬁnitive
script. There is only a standard way of interacting with a deﬁnitive script and interpreting the progression of different
scripts that are encountered in this way as belonging to one and the same activity, that of ‘playing a game of noughts and
crosses’. This principle supports an elision of one model into another that is characteristic of the kind of thought-processes
that occur in the earliest stages of sense-making, and that are of the essence in exploratory experiment. In contrast, any
formal mathematical connection that can be made between one functional program and another must be made within some
meta-framework for program transformation.
To elaborate a semantic framework for MWDS, it is necessary to appeal to just such a Jamesian notion of conjunctions
between parts of experience. To be a modeller, it is essential to be able to connect the experience of performing syntactic
transformations on the script with that of experiencing the impact these transformations have upon external state. The
extent to which such a conjunction can be ‘given in experience’ depends heavily upon the degree of familiarity and skill
of the modeller. The interpreter we use for MWDS has capabilities beyond the textual output illustrated in Section 3.3.
To implement such features, it is of course necessary to introduce mathematical notations in which to describe geometric
features. Though it is tempting to see this as evidence of a ‘post-theory’ foundation for MWDS, its practical signiﬁcance
is altogether more experientially and pragmatically determined. The script is a means to exercise the computer as an in-
strument to conjure experiences. This much can also be claimed for the script of a functional program in the hands of the
expert programmer—the correspondence between the computational behaviour as conceived and the script is potentially
immediate and internalised.
Yet more important in ascribing meaning to the deﬁnitive script is the conjunction that is made between the experiences
the computer affords (such as the textual representations of OXO positions) and the external situation to which this refers (a
game of noughts-and-crosses). It is in this respect that MWDS is seen to the greatest advantage, since (like a spreadsheet) it
can establish such direct correspondences between ‘virtual’ observables and their ‘real’ counterparts. In this connection, it is
vital to appreciate that even notions to which we ascribe transcendental qualities (such as Euclidean lines) are apprehended
through experience that can only represent them most imperfectly. The subtlety of the representational possibilities afforded
by deﬁnitive scripts stems from the open nature of the potential interaction with the script. This openness extends to a
recognition that what can be potentially observed in relation to every part of experience always transcends what is reﬂected
in the current script, and that it is in principle possible to take such further observations into account whilst yet dwelling in
the current state. This echoes James’s sentiment, cited by Barton in his preface to [13], to the effect that, in the ‘empiricist
view’:
. . . as reality is created temporally day by day, concepts . . . can never ﬁtly supersede perception.
If this appears to be making rather strong claims for the expressive power of MWDS, there is a complementary concern
that—in other contexts—the conjunctions between experience that can be realised through MWDS are too limited and
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[13], pp. 132–133 adds the disclaimer:
Experiences come on an enormous scale, and if we take them all together, they come in a chaos of incommensurable
relations that we can not straighten out. We have to abstract different groups of them, and handle these separately if we
are to talk of them at all. But how the experiences ever get themselves made, or why their characters and relations are
just such as appear, we can not begin to understand.
Clearly, not all conjunctions that are given in experience can be attributed to recognisable patterns of observables, de-
pendencies and agency that can be progressively embodied in a model and identiﬁed in its referent. Some conjunctions
are so personal and of such an obscure private nature that we can only speculate upon their origin. They may relate, for
instance, to associations made through traumatic events, or to memories of occasions shared with no other living person.
The signiﬁcance of MWDS as enabling and accounting for conjunctive relations is indeed more limited. It may be that
certain models will—by their nature—be based on patterns of observables, dependencies and agency that are meaningful for
their creators, but whose appreciation requires particular skills and perceptual capabilities. To this extent, MWDS may serve
a private representational or instrumental function for the individual. By and large, however, the principles of MWDS have
so far been applied to creating artefacts out of media that are part of the empirically established common world, and on
this basis can serve a role in sharing construals. Experiment is a vital part of this activity, as is the demonstration of models
to others. It is possible to regard the ‘scientiﬁc method’ as rooted in such a practice: identifying experimental contexts in
which speciﬁc patterns of observables, agency and dependency are made manifest and revisitable.
5. Concluding remarks
The entire approach of Empirical Modelling is itself a kind of experiment in computing aimed at broadening our under-
standing of the qualities and limitations of the classical theory of computation. The principles, notations and tools that have
been developed over the last twenty years have provided the core of a masters level module and are illustrated by a web
archive containing about 170 models [33]. Our research originated in practical model-building, and its philosophy, principles
and tools continue to develop in response to innovative project work at undergraduate and postgraduate level. The primary
emphasis has been on proof-of-concept and on making connections with other approaches to software development, es-
pecially those that exploit dependency maintenance. In the spirit of Post’s ‘return to meaning and truth’, our treatment of
observables in model-building is reminiscent of mathematics prior to its formalisation in the 19th century [2,25]. In view
of their capacity to sustain views that exhibit ambiguity, contradiction and paradox, especially in a distributed and collab-
orative model-building environment, EM artefacts may be well-suited to Byers’s vision for “how mathematicians think” [6].
Like spreadsheets, our models can be viewed as capturing states as we experience them ‘in the stream of thought’, and
their semantics is rooted in a fundamental tenet of James’s Radical Empiricism—that primitive knowledge rests on the way
in which ‘one experience knows another’ [4,13].
The name “Empirical Modelling” itself is far from ideal. Though the term ‘empirical’ conveys the key notions of obser-
vation and experiment, it all too often carries connotations of ‘unprincipled’ and ‘non-theoretical’ that we would regard as
entirely misleading. And although the term “modelling” serves to make the essential distinction from ‘programming’ that
has been extensively discussed in this paper, it also has an enormous variety of meanings. Our use of the term has more
in common with that of McCarty in his account of Humanities Computing [18] than with typical uses in a scientiﬁc setting.
A more radical and controversial suggestion—mooted in [5]—might be to associate EM with the idea of ‘construction’ that
Latour reluctantly seeks to rehabilitate in [16].
Computing has inspired new departures in the post-theory exploration of scientiﬁc knowledge. In its practice, it has also
demonstrated the potential to make a signiﬁcant impact on investigations that cannot take advantage of formal theories, but
exploit the power of computing technologies to generate interactive experiences of unprecedented richness and subtlety. The
contributions of James and Gooding to our understanding of epistemological issues that defy interpretation in post-theory
terms point to new philosophical frameworks in which interaction with physical artefacts plays a crucial part. As computing
technology matures, it becomes ever more feasible to construct interactive artefacts that complement and augment our
power to communicate through the use of language in new ways. In Empirical Modelling, we believe we have identiﬁed
principles and tools that have the potential to transform the conception and development of such artefacts. In the process,
this promises to endorse and amplify radically new approaches to exploratory investigation that are emerging from practice.
Most importantly, it can help to establish a conceptual framework for computing within which exploratory and post-theory
experimental activities can be effectively integrated.
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